Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon

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Introduction

The discourses that the United States and its closest allies have put forth asserting the necessity to globalize security have taken on an unprecedented intensity and reach. They justify themselves by propagating the idea of a global “(in)security,” attributed to the development of threats of mass destruction, thought to derive from terrorist or other criminal organizations and the governments that support them. This globalization is supposed to make national borders effectively obsolete, and to oblige other actors in the international arena to collaborate. At the same time, it makes obsolete the conventional distinction between the constellation of war, defence, international order and strategy, and another constellation of crime, internal security, public order and police investigations. Exacerbating this tendency yet further is the fact that, since September 11,
there has been ongoing frenzied speculation throughout the Western political world and among its security “experts” on how the relations between defence and internal security should be aligned in the new context of global (in)security.

In my opinion, it is this convergence of defence and internal security into interconnected networks, or into a “field” of professionals of management of unease that lies at the heart of the transformations concerning global policing. This emergent field of the management of unease explains, on the one hand, the formation of police networks at the global level, as well as the policiarisation of military functions of combat and, on the other hand, the transformation, the criminalization and the juridiciarisation of the notion of war. Moreover, this field of management of unease also accounts for how a type of Ban-opticon dispositif is established in relation to this state of unease. This form of governmentality of unease, or Ban, is characterized by three criteria: practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility.

Given these terms, is it possible to use the terminologies of a “global complicity” of domination, of the making of an Empire and a drift toward a new “soft fascism”, of a “farewell to democracy and the advent of a securitized globalized world” justifying the pre-eminence of a Western white neo-colonial project in the name of exporting freedom and combating evil? Does there, in practice, exist a single strategy that unifies different groups of professionals at the transnational level — whether they be agents of the police, the military, or the intelligence services, with a common policy of policing and sharing the interests of the elite of the different professionals of politics — and seeks to change the existing regime, curtail civil liberties, and put all individuals under its control and surveillance? Did Orwell’s 1984 in fact prefigure 2004? I do not think so. Even if we witness illiberal practices, and even if the temptation to use the argument of an exceptional moment correlated with the advent of transnational political violence of clandestine organisations, in order to justify violations of basic human rights and the extension of surveillance is very strong, we are still in liberal regimes.

In the following argument I shall show that we are far from a global complicity as a unified strategy. Heterogeneity, diverse interests, goes hand in hand with globalization. Homogenisation, seen as a carefully planned strategy against civil liberties by a global elite, as well as the belief in its success, is certainly a common feature of the discourse of some NGOs and radical academics such as Noam Chomsky. However, they do not give an accurate picture of the ongoing transformations. My analysis differs from theirs in that, for me, the combination of unease and the Ban-opticon
dispositif does not produce a unified strategy but is rather an effect of anonymous multiple struggles, which nevertheless contribute to a globalization of domination. I shall then develop the two instruments of analysis mentioned above: the field of professionals of unease management and the Ban-opticon.

The Transnationalization of (in)security: the place of the (in)security professionals in the governmentality of unease beyond the State

In the approach to (in)securitization processes that I propose here, it will be important to avoid the reigning tendency (the doxa) of the field, often reproduced by its fiercest opponents. This commonly involves attributing a coherent set of beliefs to the professionals involved in the field, an approach I avoid in order not to gratuitously unify their divergent interests by analysing them wrongly as willing allies or accomplices.

The production of a transnational “truth”

On the contrary, it is important to differentiate clearly between various parties’ standpoints on how to prioritize threats. These threats may include terrorism, war, organized crime, and the so-called migratory invasion or reverse colonisation, while at the same time they indicate the correlation between various professions, which may include professions of urban policing, criminal policing, anti-terrorist policing, customs, immigration control, intelligence, counter-espionage, information technologies, long-distance systems of surveillance and detection of human activities, maintenance of order, re-establishment of order, pacification, protection, urban combat, and psychological action. These professions do not share the same logics of experience or practice and do not converge neatly into a single function under the rubric of security. Rather, they are both heterogeneous and in competition with each other.

As we shall see, this is true, even if the differentiations mapped out by the near-mythical idea of the national and impervious state-controlled border tend to disappear, given the effects of transnationalization. Transnationalization differs from homogenisation. It rather corresponds to the continuation of struggles and differentiation at another level.

Three key events are taking place, now that it has taken several centuries for these professions to differentiate in the first place: a de-differentiation of professional activities as a result of this configuration; a growth in struggles to redefine the systems that classify the social and cul-
tural struggles as security threats; and a practical redefinition of systems of knowledge and know-how that connect the public and private security agencies who claim to possess a “truth” founded on numerical data and statistics, technologies of biometrics and sociological profiles of potential dangerous behaviour, applied to the cases of persons who feel themselves the effects of the (in)securitization, living in a state of unease.

Such professional managers of unease then claim, through the “authority of the statistics”, that they have the capacity to class and prioritize the threats, to determine what exactly constitutes security. Here, let us note that this so called enlargement of the concept is in fact reduced to the correlation between war, crime and migration, and does not include the loss of employment, car accidents or good health (itself abruptly made (in)secure as social benefits are dismantled), all elements which are considered on the contrary as normal risks. Security is then, conceptually, reduced to technologies of surveillance, extraction of information, coercion acting against societal and state vulnerabilities, in brief to a kind of generalized “survival” against threats coming from different sectors, but security is disconnected from human, legal and social guarantees and protection of individuals.

Finally, this “authority” of statistics that stems from their technological routines of collecting and categorizing data allows such professionals to establish a “field” of security in which they recognize themselves as mutually competent, while finding themselves in competition with each other for the monopoly of the legitimate knowledge on what constitutes a legitimate unease, a “real” risk.

Within the production of this regime of truth and the battle to establish the “legitimate” causes of fear, of unease, of doubt and uncertainty, the (in)security professionals have the strategy to overstep national boundaries and form corporatist professional alliances to reinforce the credibility of their assertions and to win the internal struggles in their respective national fields. The professionals of these organizations, in particular the intelligence services, draw resources of knowledge and symbolic power from this transnationalization. Eventually, these resources may give

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3. To cite merely one example, the French DST (governmentality of domestic intelligence and counter-espionage, equivalent to the British MI5) attempted to prove its force against the DGSE (in charge of foreign intelligence, equivalent to the British MI6) regarding information on terrorist groups in Northern Africa, to put into place an exchange of services between agents working on the war on terrorism and those working on counter-espionage. This happened to give it knowledge and capacities to act upon the exterior in ways that it was limited from acting on the interior. The result was to establish links between Tunisian, Moroccan, Algerian and Syrian intelligence services that were opposed to the racial-national/culturalist profiling under-
them the means to openly critique the politicians and political strategies of their respective countries. This explains how, as we have seen, when the President of the United States invokes a threat, he is only credible as long as he has not been contradicted by the intelligence community. If his claim turns out to be unfounded, the credibility of his refusal to reveal sources for his statement, purportedly based on reasons of national security, is put in grave doubt. Should the professionals of politics and the (in)security professionals come to clash directly, keeping this sort of knowledge secret is no longer considered proof of a hidden truth accessible only to the politicians. On the contrary, it casts doubt on the possibility that they might even have access to this truth, and can create a belief inside the population that politicians’ truth could very well be a misrepresentation or an outright falsity. Thus, often, the only thing left for the politicians to do is to play the card of charisma to make their opinion more convincing. They must then bank on an inflated level of public confidence and demand that the electorate maintain a quasi-religious faith in their judgment, while citizens’ groups grow still more sceptical over the information to which they do have access.

Transnational regime of truth and theory of state (sovereignty)

The notion of state, as conceived by international relations theory, cannot adapt to the result of these tensions created by transnational bureaucratic links between professionals of politics, judges, police, intelligence agencies, and the military. As opposed to what is claimed by the mainstream of cynical-realist writers on international relations, once these intra-national rivalries have impacted upon oppositional politics abroad, as in the case of Afghanistan and clandestine organizations such as Al Qada in the 1990s.

4. See the contribution of L. Bonelli in this volume.
5. See the statement of the former CIA Director, George Tenet, on February 11, 2003. Testifying in front of Congress, he contradicted George Bush’s television claim of the previous day in Cincinnati regarding information on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But he was obliged to resign the year after.
6. In my opinion, this dynamic of the field is a more effective explanation than the theories that stress the “fundamentalist” influence of religious sects, the “messianic” behaviours of Western national leaders such as Tony Blair, George Bush, José Aznar or Silvio Berlusconi.
differentiated bureaucracies, with their respective positions, exist, it becomes impossible to return to a national interest, or assume a nationalist convergence of interests allowing all parties to rally around a single government. On the contrary, these differentiated bureaucracies are actually forged in the crucible of international networks, and they autonomize different political sectors expressly for the purpose of ensuring that they exceed the domain of professional politicians. This tendency is particularly acute in the European arena, which has conventionally organized itself primarily within the framework of the nation state. For the past thirty years in Europe, new organizations have emerged, by which I mean networks and informal groups that transcend national frontiers and localize the spaces of political decision-making.

Only sociological work on the transnationalization of police and military bureaucracies has been able to show that it is no longer tenable to maintain the classical notion of the state. This demise is particularly evident in the privatized segments of these sectors, including professionals of the management of unease and actors whose profession involves risk assessment and accompanying issues of insurance coverage. These sociological works identify a transversal field of processes of (in)securitization, whereby a certain number of professionals from public institutions with domains internal to the nation — such as police — or external to the nation — such as the military — occupy the dominant positions. By maintaining these positions,

7. Among the first to note this link, Susan Strange has situated it in two contexts: the political economies of managing credit and even industrial production, and the politics of knowledge. However, she did not extend her claim to security, thinking that in the security sector if nowhere else, by virtue of sovereignty, of politics professionals were still in the position of making decisions. And if she concurred, along with others, that non-elected banking professionals made decisions in lieu of political professionals, she nonetheless refused to believe that the same was true of the military and the police, whose professional connections she did not see, and which she persisted in imagining as subordinate to national politicians. See Strange, S. (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

they exclude alternative discourses and make resistance on the part of non-professionals quite impossible. The field is thus established between these “professionals”, with specific “rules of the game”, and rules that presuppose a particular mode of socialization or *habitus*. This *habitus* is inherited from the respective professional trajectories and social positions, but is not strongly defined along the lines of national borders.

In very simple terms, we can no longer distinguish between an internal order reigning, thanks to the police, by holding the monopoly on legitimate violence, and an anarchic international order which is maintained by an equilibrium of national powers vis-à-vis the armies and diplomatic alliances. In effect, the State is no longer the double-faced Janus god, familiar to us from antiquity. Cast into doubt is the relevance of seeing a rigid separation between internal and external scenes that is so fundamental for Raymond Aron’s realist school. The logics of state administrations are completely blurred. The status of state territoriality is under discussion, as well as the state capacities of territorial surveillance and control over that same territory. Even beyond these questions of the state capacity of surveillance and control, the equivalence between society, nation and state is symbolically cast into doubt. Those who govern can no longer rely on the rhetoric of sovereignty, citizenship, and the “*raison d’Etat*” with the same performativity. Politicians’ ability to manage is put into question, as is the correspondence between their beliefs and actual situations. This form of political crisis suggests that the state could be out of date, no longer relevant, and that it is in fact more appropriately seen in the realm of ritual. The suspicion, initially applied to politicians in the former Communist regimes, has in fact become a general property of all sorts of arenas of political life in Western democracies. Domination has been de-coupled from the state’s territorial form and its traditional political classes. This means that domination is not less powerful, rather that it now takes on new forms: the transnationalization of bureaucracies of surveillance and control shifts in systems of accountability between businesses and politicians, regarding the definition of work and the forms its redistribution should take, and new transnational lifestyles and professional cultures. But as they encounter the transnational, these forms only add to the untenability of the territorial state as it was classically defined by Hobbes and Max Weber, and this encounter can in fact undermine the bases of legitimacy that the traditional political classes cannot yet effectively abandon. In parallel to the ascent of a corporate-based world,

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once it is admitted that the state is no longer a unitary actor, this transnationalization has impacted upon the entire ensemble of bureaucracies and agents who make up the state. This transnationalization has not simply affected private entities, NGOs and protest movements; it has primarily affected actors commonly considered as public entities. The transnationalization of bureaucracies has created a socialization and a set of differentiated professional interests that take priority over national solidarities.

The field of professionals of the management of unease

The stakes of knowledge

Given that this field of professionals has long been in existence, it is surprising that it has never become the object of analysis. Why has this blind spot persisted when this field plays such a central role in the relations of domination? This is undoubtedly due in great part to the common perception of the military and police as the obedient executors and zealous servants of the state, a narrative found equally in the internal discourse of these professionals and in the critical discourse on the repressive state apparatus. Moreover, the make-up of disciplinary knowledge in the social sciences — in particular the insistence that political science only concerns domestic issues and that international relations are completely autonomous from domestic issues — has obscured the relations between the professionals. The disciplines have tended to divide the field into two entirely exclusive social universes, envisioned as the world of police and the world of the military. This has the effect of devaluing in one single blow all the “intermediary” institutions such as military police, border guards and customs agents. The structuring of academic knowledge has blocked analysis by reproducing the mapping of state borders onto organizational divisions. The result is that separate bounded entities are created — an internal and external domain, divided so that the former, ruled according to the social contract and a monopoly on violence, is opposed to the latter’s antithetically anarchic international system and a Hobbesian horizon expanded to an international level positing the possibility of war between each state and the others. A corresponding division is maintained between the police and national justice systems, seen as belonging to the internal domain, and the military and diplomacy, considered as external to this domain.

The simple fact of describing police actions across borders, as I have done earlier in my book, blurs the categories of traditional understanding that depend on the radical separation between the inside and the outside 10. Descriptions of military activities within a domestic context, or the surveillance of the Internet by intelligence agencies, the developments of criminal justice at the international level have the same effect 11. R.B.J. Walker has shown elsewhere how this inside/outside opposition both serves as the limit of the political imagination and the source of its coherence 12. As Ethan Nadelmann underscores in his pioneering analysis of DEA agents who conduct work outside of the US, This book represents the first significant engagement of two scholarly disciplines – US foreign policy and criminal justice — that have had remarkably little to do with one another. The vast majority of criminal justice scholars have extended their attentions no further than their nations’ borders […] Among students of US foreign policy […] almost no one has paid much attention to issues of crime and law enforcement […] 13.

Now, other works including mine have advanced a step further — some would say a step too far — by reconsidering the lines that have been traditionally drawn as the legitimate borders of academic knowledge. We have been particularly concerned to advance a political sociology of international relations that reintroduces international phenomena, by making them normal and banal social facts on a daily basis. When we break down the dichotomy between knowledge of the inside and the outside, the border between the police world and the military world appears to be more permeable. We can thus take account of all the intermediary agencies such

11. These studies were conducted by the team of the Center on Conflicts and the ELISE network. See http://www.conflicts.org.
12. R.B.J. Walker’s reading on this point in Inside/Outside is particularly important because it reminds us of the extent to which the analytical grid differentiating between inside and outside that our analyses snap to so ‘intuitively’ is the product of the thought of the State, the logic of academic disciplines, and the symbolic practices and profits established by this differentiation. He shows that a different conception of politics in terms of flux and field allows us both to bring together categories of practices that had been otherwise assigned to a space of inside or outside (to the detriment of analysis) and to differentiate these practices otherwise. My analysis is strongly indebted to this work. See Walker, R.B.J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
as polices with military status, border guards, customs agents, or immigration agents, to better understand the links these agents establish among themselves and how the effects of their positions have implications on their respective narratives. Furthermore, breaking down this dichotomy allows us to understand how a semantic continuum is constructed, with the struggle against terrorism at one end and the reception of refugees at the other. The “deconstruction” of the boundaries between different disciplines of knowledge has allowed a coherent field of analysis to emerge, a configuration having its own rules and its own coherence — the field of professionals of the management of unease. The field becomes intelligible where previously one saw only marginal subjects confined by disciplines that mutually ignored one another and constructed themselves in opposition to one another, or at best at the intersection between different areas. Such new fields of intelligibility include police working beyond borders, international justice condemning military crimes, or the construction of the image of the enemy within by intelligence services, such that their profiling applies to certain groups of foreign residents within a country itself. With this theory of the field of the unease management professionals, one can thus cross the habitual line traced by the social sciences between internal and external, between problems couched in terms of defence and problems of the police, and between problems of national security and the problem of public order. This hypothesis indeed reunites the military as well as the police and all the other professionals of management of threats in its own terms of “figuration” (in the words of Norbert Elias) or *habitus* (to use the term of Pierre Bourdieu).

After having hesitated across the span of several articles on how precisely to state this hypothesis — interpenetration between sectors, merging of different social universes — I now prefer to speak in terms of de-differentiation of the internal and external security issues. This de-differentiation of internal and external security allows us, indeed, to recall the socially and historically constructed character of the process of differentiation, in terms of the socio-genesis of the Western State as outlined by Norbert Elias or Charles Tilly. It also allows us to think the field of security as a field crossing the internal and external, a new generative space of intelligence.

struggles between security professionals that produces common interests, an identical program of truth and new forms of knowledge.

To comprehend this field, as it establishes itself within a transnational space of the management of unease in societies of risk, it is necessary to perform its genealogy, to note the similarities that are consistent throughout the space, and establish what is significant about the differences, which are as much professional as geographic. One benefit of this approach is to show how police cooperation is linked to the questions of border control, immigration, the fight against terrorism, to relations with armed forces and to trans-Atlantic relations; we could even include the relations between public and private management of security under this aspect of police coercion. It is important not to create an ivory-tower academic problem by considering the organizations called national police as self-contained objects determining what defines the police today. These days, doing police work constitutes less and less a national question and consists less and less of an activity restricted to public organizations known by the official names of national police forces.

Policing in networks, policing at a distance

The activities of policing have become more extensive. Police activities are formed of connections between different institutions and function in networks. Their formation also occurs as they take on a large new spectrum of activities and project it well beyond national borders. These geographic implementations of networks deterritorialize police activities in terms of mission and institutions and now include the judiciary itself, with the linkage between Eurojust and Europol. These “policing” activities, in particular those devoted to surveillance and maintenance of public order, now take place at a distance, beyond national borders, as for example with detective experts of hooligans in international football matches, or for anti-globalization protest and demonstrations. But it also occurs beyond traditional police activities and reaches foreign affairs. The bypassing of borders through the policing of internal security also occurs through the dispatch of internal security advisors abroad, in the consulates that issue visas allowing people to enter the Schengen zone. It affects

15. Due to space constraints, I do not list the practical collaborations between different police forces at the European level. Many previous works have done this; my priority is rather to suggest how understanding the methodological and theoretical implications of collaboration among European police can benefit our analysis.
the airline companies that, instead of police, are delegated the task of verifying passports and hire private security guards and train their personnel to these tasks of control. It even transforms the role of the militaries in their tasks of peace building and reconstruction as they now are asked to oversee also potential organised criminal activities that could affect internal security. Finally, it creates links with the intelligence agencies by sharing some of the same databases. All these activities participate in what is called the “debriefings of internal security abroad”, where surveillance projects itself on spaces, states, and persons seen as a danger and a threat to national security and public order.

This tendency to operate beyond national borders occurs not only through the activities linked to the Schengen system of surveillance and the actions taken in that framework by each member state’s liaison officer. It also exceeds the actual borders of the European Union when it generates demands on EU candidate countries, such as those that were placed on the ten new member countries in 2004, or when it extends to the EU’s “circle of friends”, by conditioning economic aid to the permission to have police and immigration activities inside each of these countries.

At the same time, these police activities are themselves undergoing a redefinition, the effect of which is to enlarge the spectrum in a particular way. It would be patently misguided to assume that these activities are primarily oriented toward crime or anti-terrorist actions despite rhetoric. The main activity rather consists of keeping the poorest foreigners at a distance, through controlling the flux of mobile populations. Fifteen years of intensive rhetoric have created the belief that poverty, crime and mobile populations are inextricably linked, but the correlation between crime, foreignness and poverty is altogether false.

The term, “internal security”, now used to designate security at the European level, is a gauge of these two new kinds of reach. On the one hand, the reach is geographic, with the dimension of European and transatlantic cooperation; on the other, the reach derives from the role and duties of the various agencies of (in)security. The geographic reach, and the redefinition of spheres of competence it implies, have been the object of numerous commentaries. The actual extent of the changes that have

taken place at the everyday level, however, has been miscalculated due to the belief in the discourse of the suspension of controls inside the EU and their localisation at the external border of the EU, which supposedly creates freedom of circulation for all inside the EU. In fact, it should be emphasized that controls have been delocalized and modernized, but they have in no way been done away with: controls continue inside, albeit in an aleatory fashion, at the external border and even outside. Both (in)security professionals and politicians have remained silent on this issue of how activities linked to the control of the transnational flow of persons have extended their reach. By adding these tasks to the traditional tasks of combating crime, and thus by proceeding through an extension of the definition of security, these actors have strengthened their institutional position. The consequence of this extension of the definition of internal security at the European level is that it puts widely disparate phenomena on the same continuum — the fight on terrorism, drugs, organized crime, cross-border criminality, illegal immigration — and to further control the transnational movement of persons, whether this be in the form of migrants, asylum-seekers or other border-crossers — and even more broadly of any citizen who does not correspond to the a priori social image that one holds of his national identity (e.g. the children of first-generation immigrants, minority groups). Control is thus enlarged beyond the parameters of conventional crime control measures and policing of foreigners, to also include control of persons living in zones labelled “at risk” where inhabitants are put under surveillance because they correspond to a type of identity or behaviour that is linked to predispositions felt to constitute a risk.

This new reach of activities allows for a new, more individualized logic of surveillance. Its new reach privileges the Ministers of Interior and the Ministers of Justice, insofar as these ministers in particular have realized how to combine the new logics of surveillance at the level of European police collaboration through the form of a network of relations among civil servants that permits them to understand the situation beyond national borders. This enables the emergence of a body of expertise on extra-territorial matters, permitting us to see ministers in charge of internal security becoming internationalized. This reach develops in the same way as it does for customs and takes place to the detriment of the social ministers (Minister of Labour, etc.) or specialized ministers (Minister of European affairs, etc.). And this reach goes so far as to impinge upon the domains of the Minister of Interior and the ministers oriented toward international

17. For instance, the banlieues (French disadvantaged suburbs), or declining city centres.
affairs — foreign affairs and defence. The various ministers of interior then take on initiatives addressing foreign political matters insofar as they may say that it is to prevent repercussions on internal security matters.

Several works have recently drawn our attention to ways in which national police systems are structured in differentiated networks and draw on international resources according to their respective professional specialties, including drug trafficking, terrorism, maintenance of order, and football hooliganism. This differentiation of specialty means that the police, therefore, do not form a single, unique and homogenous network. We would be better served by thinking of an “archipelago of policing”, or a mosaic that holds together the national police, military police, customs control, immigration, consulates, and even intelligence services and the military, in the way, for instance, that international police currently operate in the Balkans. These archipelagos are structured beyond their “common” activities, along lines of cultural identification (e.g. French, British, German, or Northern and Southern European), profession (e.g. police, police with military status, customs agents), organizational level (e.g. national, local, municipal), mission (e.g. intelligence, border control, criminal police), knowledge (perceptions of threats and of a hierarchy of adversaries) and technological innovation (computer systems, electronic surveillance, police liaison officers who are crucial in the management and the exchange of information between agencies).

For quite some time, the field of (in)security has been structured through trans-national exchanges of information and the routinization of processes dealing with intelligence information. It would be naive to view this phenomenon as a simple effect of globalization. The national police have been networked ever since they were created as institutions. As opposed to the judiciary and criminal police, the prerogative of the intelligence police has always been conducted irrespective of territorial boundaries and has focused on people’s identities, whether real or fictional, regardless of their origin or place of dwelling. Since the end of the nineteenth century, police collaboration has been quite active against “subversives.” But there is no doubt that the idea of Europeanization has caused relations to deepen beyond the former capabilities of Interpol since the end of the 1970s, with the creation of the Berne and Trevi clubs. The ideas of free movement and border control appear in full force at the European level in the 1980s. The legal categories of border, sovereignty and policing have been compromised by five main transformations: the distinction between the internal and external borders of the EU; the creation of international airport detention zones to immediately send back foreigners who do not have the right documents to enter into the Schengen area; the attempt...
to impose the term of ‘economic refugee’ and to redefine who is a refugee,
with the ensuing lessening of the admissions granted to people seeking the
right to asylum; the use of the term ‘immigrant’ instead of the term ‘forei-
gner’, with the ensuing inclusion of some nationals within the frame of the
suspected foreigners; the relativization of the term “foreigner”, as opposed
to national, in order to strengthen the distinction between community
members and Third Country Nationals as non-members.

But, due to the inability to entrench and maintain borders as
advocated by the rhetoric of security, each organization, each country,
separately, or in collaboration with others, tries to displace the locus of
control upstream to block and deter the will to travel in the country of ori-
gin, and to displace the burden of controlling movement and crime back
onto other police 18.

These changes have caused a profound disjunction between the
discourse on European internal security and the practices actually carried
out. The external borders are indeed sometimes arbitrary places, but in no
instance do they represent an effective electronic security barrier. Land
borders are very easily breached and often the police allow candidates to
enter and, as long as it is clear that they have no intention of remaining in
the country, don’t check their identity and even explain to them how to
reach the neighbouring country (Cf France and UK concerning Sangatte).
In fact, the border controls within Europe are not dismantled as was pro-
mised by the rhetoric of free movement and its checks and balances.
Control is privatized, delegated to airline companies and airports, which,
in turn, subcontract the job to private security companies 19. Control is
also sometimes maintained but simply displaced some kilometres away.
The greatest measure of control is exercised through the visas and the
controls in the consulates of the passengers’ country of origin. The articu-
lation of the SIS and visa allocation structure practices of control guide the
tactical decisions, in the war on fraud concerning false documents, and
influence the process of making in-duplicable documents using technolo-
gies other than finger-printing, such as numeric photographs, facial or reti-

de l’immigration’ in A. Rea, L. Balbo (eds) Immigration et racisme en Europe, Bruxelles:
Complexe: 80-94
migration control’ in V. Guiraudon, C. Joppke, Controlling a new migration world, London:
Routledge: pages 121-149; Guiraudon, V. (2002) ‘Les compagnies de transport dans le con-
trôle migratoire à distance’, Cultures & Conflicts, 45: 124-147.
nal scanning and other biometric techniques. These technologies, permitting the police to discipline and punish beyond borders via the collaboration between security agencies, are multiplying a tendency that polarizes the profession of policing. In general, two types of policing appear within the parameters of the national police institution: the first employs unqualified or minimally qualified personnel, who are however present and visible at the local level as an auxiliary to the municipality, the prefecture, or other police. The second type takes an opposite approach by employing a few, highly qualified people, who are in close contact with other security and social control agencies, characterised by discretion and distance. In what they call an osmotic relationship between high-ranking spheres of government and private strategic actors, these individuals take it as their mission to prevent crime by acting upon conditions in a pro-active way, anticipating where crime might occur and who might generate it. Their work then consists of making prospective analyses based on statistical knowledge, hypothetic correlations and supposed trends, then anticipating a future in terms of worst case scenario and acting to prevent it. These professionals believe they are more professional and competent than the others, and their ambition is to assemble, on the basis of data generated, openly available information, social-scientific data and the techniques of police intelligence operations. This dream of a common and consensual epistemic community knowing the future and drawing the line of the present from this (reversible) knowledge haunts the imaginary of these professionals, who police societal transformations at a distance — a geographic one and a temporal distance piloted by this logic of anticipation merging science and fiction. This perspective places them in a virtual space from which they may oversee everything, while being so discreet that they themselves are no longer seen. We also no longer see those who actually carry out the actions of the imaginary — the large number of police, judges and prison guards. Population management operates less like a rooted practice of herding than a nomadic practice that follows the seasonal migration of populations, which is created as the effect of such proactive logics.

Surveillance at a distance means working to control the ingoing and outgoing movement of populations. It occurs through “locks” and mechanisms of exclusion such as visas, controls put in place by the airline

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20. I am indebted to Laurent Bonelli for drawing my attention to the way these two types of control are polarized; once we realize that, it is impossible to see the national police as a unique, stand-alone profession. See Monjardet, D. (1996) *Ce Que Fait La Police: Sociologie De La Force Publique*. Paris: La Découverte.
companies, deportations and readmissions. Not only does it restrict freedom of movement but it also creates penitentiary spaces, though these ones may not normally be categorized as such (in France and Greece, for instance, the detention centres and international airport detention areas are called *waiting zones*) 21. Because its de-localized policing function is delegated to the consulates located in the traveller’s country of origin, this mode of control is much less visible than police working on the front lines of border control. Refusal to issue a visa becomes the first weapon of the police and, as such, it becomes the place of greatest arbitrariness in terms of decision-making. Police practice is directed at the surveillance of foreigners or poor ethnic minorities and extends its reach beyond its prior limits of criminal investigation, through pro-active actions that enable the police to pinpoint groups that would be “predisposed to criminality” according to sociological knowledge. The profile of the guilty changes: it no longer derives from a supposed criminality but from a supposed “undesirability.” Prisons that confine the guilty are less significant in this dispositif than the new penitentiary spaces such as holding areas that reproduce the same carceral conditions as prisons but without the legal judgment of guilt. The relaxation of surveillance on the majority of individuals, seen as too heavy and too totalizing, benefits the global harvest of information and the targeting of the most mobile groups: the diasporas, migrants and, if the argument holds, tourists.

I have applied the notion of ‘field’ to these professionals engaged in internal security to describe the institutional archipelagos within which they work, whether privatized or public. In the name of security, these professionals manage technologies of control and surveillance, the goal of which is to tell us who and what should inspire unease, as opposed to what is inevitable.

**Field and networks**

As I analysed in my book *Polices en réseaux. L’expérience européenne*, as well as in several articles, a field should be defined in terms of four dimensions. First, the field as a field of force, or a magnetic field, a field of attraction that polarizes around the specific stakes of the agents involved; second, the field as a field of struggle, or a battle-field, that

enables us to understand the “colonizing” activities of various agents, the defensive retreats of others and the various kinds of tactical algorithms that organize bureaucratic struggles; third, the field as a field of domination vis-à-vis another field, the field as a positioning inside a larger political and social space permitting the possibility of statements making truth claims on the basis of knowledge and know-how; and fourth, the field as a transversal field, the trajectory of which reconfigures formerly autonomous social universes and shifts the borders of these former realms to include them totally or partially in the new field. Exemplifying this in the case of security is a shift that reconfigures some police and military professions as well as the intermediary professions that follow upon the de-differentiation of internal and external securities through the practices of violence and technologies of identification and surveillance.

If we are to attempt a preliminary definition of the field of (in)security professionals, or more generally of the management of unease, we would begin by saying that the field depends less on the real possibility of exerting force, as in the classical sociological accounts of Hobbes or Weber, where the field would be defined purely as a function of coercion. It rather depends on the capacity of the agents to produce statements on unease and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease. It also depends on the capacity of people and techniques to conduct their research into this unfolding body of statements at a routine level, to develop correlations, profiles, and classify those who must be identified and placed under surveillance. Unease can raise fears, risks and the perception of non-intentional threats. But, at the same time, agencies use their analytical capabilities to anthropomorphize danger and construct a vision of the enemy, sometimes causing, whether intentionally or not, a social polarization that extends or restructures political alliances. The process of (in)securitization rests then on the routine abilities of agents to “manage and control life”, according to Foucault’s words, across the concrete material conditions that they put in place.

The field as a field of forces

If the field of (in)security functions as a field of forces exerting their pressures on the agents engaged in it, it is because it combines with a certain homogeneity found in these agents’ bureaucratic interests, their similar ways of defining the potential enemy and of gathering knowledge on this enemy through diverse technologies and routines. It tends to homogenize these

22. See graphics in the appendix

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agents’ ways of looking into a limited array of anthropomorphized types, to define a “localization” shared by all those who draw on the field 23. To understand the positions and discourses that situate these agents, it is necessary to correlate them with their professional socialization and their positions of authority, in terms of their roles as spokesmen of “legitimate” institutions within the field of (in)security professionals or the management of unease.

The field as a field of struggles

Field of forces, the (in)security field also functions as a field of struggles within which the agents situate themselves, with the resources and the differentiated goals that structure their positions. In this sense, the field of (in)security is a *field of struggles to conserve or transform the configuration of the field’s own forces* 24. If such struggles occur between these actors, if these competitions take place, it is because in fact they do have the same interests, the same sense of the game and have the same perception of what is at stake.

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23. For instance, if the immigrant tends to exist as the common adversary of police, military and politicians, this is not because he is designated as such by global consensus. This seeming convergence is actually the effect of different modes of insecurity that converge to make him intelligible as a subject of security (for the police, with regard to crime, terrorism, drugs; for the military, with regard to subversion, grey zones; for the press, economically through unemployment, demographically through the birth rate and the fear of racial-ethnic mixing, etc.). The discourse on assimilation becomes itself a line of security insofar as it is concerned with integrating people and not developing them, in the interest of precluding future opposition. This change in immigration is not simply a change in perception, discourse or public policy. Above all, it derives from concrete practices, related to transformations of practical knowledge (know-how) and technologies. If we want to analyse such transformations in knowledge, we need first to re-link them to actual practices rather than turning first to the second-order rationalizations that agents retroactively read into their practices. In other words, we need to observe face-to-face relations where the impact of technologies actually used counts more than the representations, perceptions and discourses that agents attribute to their respective roles.


But in order to avoid stereotypes, it is necessary not to assume an automatic correspondence between positions and certain types of discourses. The perception, within these small groups, of what is at stake can be affected by such dynamics as interpersonal behaviours or multipositioning strategies. Moreover, the analysis of the differences between positions should not let us forget that the tactics of bureaucratic “colonization” do not advance step by step and locally by incremental enlargement, they may jump to other activities (for example, from the threat of terrorism to natural disasters in the name of speed and discipline). Such is the case even if it is necessary to pragmatically believe in the proximity of these activities by building semantic bridges within the continuum of risks, threats and (in)security. The fundamental thing is that any action undertaken by one agent to shift the economy of forces in his favour has repercussions on all the other actors as a whole. These struggles are fundamental to understand the internal economy of the field and the processes of formation and reach that characterize it.

In the specific case of the field of (in)security, the “field” is determined by the struggles between police, intermediaries and military agencies about the boundaries and definition of the term “security”, and around the prioritization of the different threats, as well as the definition of what is not a threat but only a risk or even an opportunity. The central question relevant to defining security is thus to know who is authorized or to whom is delegated the symbolic power to designate exactly what the threats are. In this respect, it is impossible to evaluate the meaning of threats by judging exclusively on the manifest basis of statements themselves. To qualify this, we have to pay attention to who is in the position of enunciation and to the positions of authority of the enunciators themselves, while keeping in mind their personal, political and institutional interests within the field. Undoubtedly, it is too early to definitively define the centrifugal forces that compel the police and military to share the same interests, the same rules and the same vision of what is at stake, i.e. what are the emerging threats. Despite the current state of the field, one could imagine centripetal forces that would work to cause the field of (in)security to diverge again along the boundary of internal and external activities, or even break it apart in different arrangements, while maintaining the same categories (for instance, a division follo-

25. We could here also mention the work of Graham Allison on the second and third models, as well as Bourdieu’s sociological work. Allison’s work is a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms of struggle and allows a better comprehension of the fluidity of subject positions. See Allison, G.T., Żelikow, P. (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman. In particular, see the competitions that take place around fluid borders and the open-ended missions that characterize the colonizing activities of the agencies.
wing the logics of technologies). If the transformations of conflicts did not have a direct and determining impact on the field of security, the chance of a revival of the military threat from Russia or China, however remote, could immediately be interpreted as extremely dangerous and could reintroduce a cleavage which would bring back an earlier police/military division of labour, impairing the tendency to share resources. But in fact, the extension of the so-called humanitarian missions or the maintenance of order in the non-Western countries threatens to accelerate the effects of the field by merging even more policing, intelligence and military activities. September 11 has clearly played a role in producing a convergence between positions taken on internal and international security. But this convergence has also revalorized military efforts and has legitimized the fact that the “war” on terrorism should no longer be conducted under the aegis of the police. Above all, it has underscored how the effects of the field were propagated in both directions, the one of enlargement to include new geographies and the functional one, with the will to mobilise and extend to all professionals of the unease management the role of “antiterrorist” surveillance.

The field as a field of domination

The field of (in)security also functions as a field of domination in relation to other social fields, including sometimes the field of the professionals of politics. It tends to monopolize the power to define the “legitimately recognized threats” (global organised crime, global terrorism, war on terror, etc.).

26. See the contribution of C. Olsson in this volume.
27. Transatlantic collaboration on antiterrorism, new alliances and revival of a different NATO.
28. To give an example at the European level, the exacerbation of struggles at the national level led the actors involved in them to put pressure on international contacts to triumph nationally. In order to understand the Europeanization of this phenomenon and its impact, we have to see how the alliances made beyond national borders to promote a certain conception or style of police within these borders exert force on the more aggregate Europeanization process. The French national police, namely its services involved in the anti-terrorist fight, have been able to use Europeanization as an opportunity to reinforce their power and, in some cases, to free themselves from the classical domains of counter-espionage. The connections are passed from central service to central service with an attempt to be the sole interlocutor of the foreign agency. On the other hand, the late arrivals of the gendarmes have formed connections at the local level, thereby profiting from their manpower at the borders, and have played the card of the trans-border, working with the police of the Länder, themselves opposed to the BKA (German Federal Criminal Police Office) working with French police. The historicity of this context is important. Contrary to what a quick reading of Allison suggests, these struggles are not maintained in perpetuity by an economy of personal desires or by their being structurally inherent to bureaucracies, but by the dynamic relation that emerges from their reciprocal trajectories and knowledge, practical knowledge and technologies that they employ. The dynamic
etc.). This is to say that the agents of the field fight for the authority to impose their definition of who and what inspires fear. In the competition between the field of the professionals of politics and the field of the professionals of (in)security, indeterminate spaces exist where each agent is “obliged to negotiate” and where “collusive transactions” operate in the strong sense of the term. The field, as I have just described it, essentially encompasses the public bureaucracies but also includes private bureaucracies, businesses, political intermediaries and groupings that work to “develop a security-oriented mindset” in the public sphere. Our understanding of these private actors is still incomplete but there is more and more convincing work available that helps us comprehend the complex links between these entities and the public bureaucracies. The field of security exercises its “force” or “capacity of

of struggles takes on the particular configuration of the field that tends to recompose the process of (in)securitization, by reconciling the military and police, and thus the modification of their relative distance. What is necessary is to persuade politicians that struggles over budgets, missions, and legitimacy are the most fruitful areas for managing transnational threats. Here, the determining factors are the trajectories of the agencies, in particular those that form new networks out of formerly unconnected agencies. This is the case with the gendarmeries that bridge the police and military worlds, or the judges, who connect the police and judiciary worlds, or alternatively, the case of customs agents in the war on drugs, who create bridges between the police and the various economic imperatives that privilege the free circulation of goods. The interests of these intermediary agencies in linking these two sorts of universes are opposed to the interests of the most traditional agencies and, inside the latter, to the interests of those who have everything to lose, such as those devoted to deterrence in the military and the public security police within the police. Thus the position of the actors, and still more their trajectories, tend to determine the positions they adopt, the types of discursive registers that they will use and the kinds of rhetoric they mobilize for their struggle, making them effectively blind to their actual similarities and common interests.

29. On the idea of the collusive transaction, see Dobry, M. (1992) *Sociologie des crises politiques*. Paris: Presses de la FNSP. At the national level, the French police in Algeria was subject to these transactions. At the EU level, the conflict between the Council and the Commission in the frame of the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the EU) also reflects on occasion these conflicts. For the moment, this approach of relations between the different fields is not sufficiently analysed. Bourdieu’s research on a rate of conversion of the capital via a field of the state is scarcely convincing and is confined by its dependence on thinking the nation-state. Dobry’s work is without doubt the most pertinent and appropriate for analyzing these transnational dynamics of domination, but it would be necessary to take the analysis beyond its current domain of multi-sectorial mobilization. Both these analyses contribute to our analysis by showing how untenable is the image of politics conducted by national governments in opposition to one another under a European umbrella. This sort of analysis forces us to question the autonomy of the most powerful actors in the field of security, who are political actors in the same sense as the bankers analysed by Susan Strange. Her analysis, in turn, provokes us to reflect on the limited capacities of the plan of security defined as local and undertaken by professional politicians.

attraction" by its power to impose on other agents through the belief that the
insiders of the field possess, as “experts”, the supplementary knowledge and
secrets that only professionals may have. This belief is reaffirmed through
everyday routine work, technologies and “exchange and sharing of informa-
tion”, as a certain approach to social change, risk, threats and enemies that is
constantly invoked and reconfirmed. The field of (in)security is thus at the
heart of the field of power, as a bureaucratic field composed of experts having
the capacity to claim that they know better than others, even if others are the
professionals of politics, including the head of states. In this field, the agents,
be they governmental or non-governmental, enter into struggles with the
goal of settling a specific sphere of practices through the various institu-
tions of laws, rules, norms and the daily routine knowledge of what rules and
resolutions of such “settlement” are permitted or forbidden. Even if national
professionals of politics still play a key role in structuring security issues,
because of their daily involvement in settling security practices, the agencies
and bureaus that comprise the world of security are arguably the sole agents
able to assert, with some success rate, their definition of what inspires unease.
While it is certainly true that all these agencies have an interest in maintaining
the terms that political actors use to label and frame the issues, they overlay
and invest these definitions with their own significances and practices. In this
respect, the ongoing conflicts between agencies work in conjunction with the
struggle that each agency undertakes to be recognized by politicians who still
retain the power to abolish or reform them (i.e. the homeland security
restructuring the bureaucratic balance of power between FBI, CIA, State
department, Defence Department, Pentagon and border guards, or the effort
to homogenise the assessment of a list of terrorists and the conflicting rela-
tions between second and third pillars with Europol, Frontex, Eurojust,
EACPO on one side, and Sitcen and the Antiterrorist coordinator, de Vries
on the other). This struggle also occurs in conjunction with the struggle to
exclude other actors (churches, human rights organizations, Red Cross, alter-
native medias) by disqualifying their points of view on the definition of
threats and on the public policies aiming to prevent the threats.

The field’s effects

The following eight effects of the field of security allow us to iden-
tify the field’s domination effects. First, the systems of representation of
agents who previously did not share these systems converge, due to their sha-

31. Operations that may consist of classing, sorting, filtering, excluding, profiling or enclosing.
32. See the contribution of A. Tsoukala in this volume.
red interest in entering into the struggle to define and prioritize “emerging threats”. Second, professionals in the field of (in)security place all global social transformation that affects society and to which politicians are unable to respond under the heading of threat, the ultimate consequence of which is to define an enemy. This convergence occurs even if the immediate experience of the agents has led them to privilege their own roles, their own specific missions for which they entered into competition to begin with (global organized crime versus global terrorism). Third, security agencies recognize from a practical point of view that any standpoint, even those of different nations or professions, can stabilize or de-stabilize the whole body of relations that the agency maintains with others. Thus, each agency integrates this practical recognition within its strategies. Fourth, some security agencies that formerly appeared as marginal to the worlds of the police and the military now modify their images and appear, whether rightly or wrongly, to be at the core of the surveillance and control dispositif — agencies such as customs, immigration, national guard, police with military status. Fifth, professionals of politics favour a differentiated allocation of missions and budgets that benefits these “intermediary” agencies and lessens the authority of more traditional agencies. Sixth, contacts and international networks in the economy of national or regional budget struggles become necessary. Seventh, knowledge and know-how in the management of unease have a determining influence on how practices of violence are resolved. Eighth, such management takes place at a distance through technologies targeted to this use.

The field of (in)security as a transversal field

The problem is not therefore to follow a static conception of borders that we would imagine laid down once and for all, but to adopt a dynamic conception of borders where borders are themselves on the move. In such an approach, the main stake is to state precisely what such a dynamic conception would consist of. Borders are “concretions” of power struggles in a specific space, which is often materialised within a territory. Michel Foucher’s formula goes beyond the exclusive frame of the national border to coin the concept of social borders, where space is not directly correlated with a uni-dimensional vision of the territory 33. Borders are, indeed, sometimes institutions existing in the material world, such as the physical borders of states, or borders adjudicated by the juridical relation that regulates the differentiation between the inside and the outside. Sometimes, however,

their property of fluidity is more important than their material existence, if
the field is in formation and is not sufficiently established to make the costs
of entry prohibitive. The materialization of the borders by law or by pro-
fessional norms is thus often lagging behind the reality of the borders of a
field structured by the struggle and relations of attraction. The materializa-
tion of borders legitimates and consecrates a particular moment, at which it
was in the interest of all actors to negotiate in the precise way that resulted
in this materialization. This temporal gap signifies that it is extremely diffi-
cult to empirically trace the borders of the field by examining it solely from
the point of view of its institutional characteristics, as they inevitably
retrace a moment that is actually anterior to the relations of force that cau-
sed that moment to materialize.

The transversality of the field is a term that allows us to mark off
the space beyond national borders that characterizes the relations between
agents (essentially public) of the field, without presupposing the existence
of another higher level of enclosure (such as the EU, the idea of Europe in
a broader sense, or the Western world)34. Following the notion of trans-
versality, we can integrate the idea of “glocality”, introduced by Japanese
management companies to brand the same products with different adver-
tisements coined for local people, and that James Rosenau popularised to
show that many phenomena connect the global and the local. Glocality
and transversality allow us to understand that the field of (in)security is
deployed at a level that is reducible neither to the national political field,
nor to a level between two nations, or even to the European level. The
State, here, is not the space of convertibility, or ‘universal currency,’ for
different modes of social capital. Bourdieu, here, was wrong and was not
careful enough to the transnational and transversal characters of the global-
ization process. Beyond the State, the notion of the transversal field of
(in)security makes possible the analysis of a space that is indeed social and
political but transcends the division of internal/external or national/intern-
national imposed by the territorial state of mind. This social space, or this
field of (in)security, is empirically constructed as a result of the differentia-

34. On the relations between the structure of the EU and its "stateness," see Caporaso, J.A.
in Context. New York: Palgrave. Conventionally, each time the border is re-thought it is
conceived at another level, as a more global entity, enclosing space. In contrast to this, I pro-
spose to think of the transversal nature of the border as a state of non-closure, like the topo-
logy of the Möbius strip. See Bigo, D. 'Internal and External Security(ies)'; op. cit.; Balibar,
Découverte.
ted positions of different security agencies (national police, local police, customs controls, border control services, intelligence agencies, armies, etc.) in different European countries (the centrality of the French police, the diversity of the British police, German federalism, Polish specific traditions, etc.). So, it is effectively defined by the place that these agencies occupy as national players, but also by the transnational networks of relations that they have formed in a space larger than their own spaces, the cyclical defining property of which is its tendency to enlarge itself incessantly due to its refusal to recognize boundaries, whether they are geographic or cultural.

For these reasons, when describing and analysing the field of (in)security, it is not sufficient to merely reconstruct the practical knowledge of the respective actors by means of interviews, or to merely inventory the agencies that make up this know-how. Because, in doing so, it is assumed that by adding the bureaucratic and political actors of the EU member states – supposedly “natural” partners for these relations – we have a “logical frame”. This frame is in fact given by the fact that nation-states are naturalized as the arena where all (in)security relations are negotiated and where the effects of (in)security have to be understood by examining the interactions of these members, judging their resemblance and differences to the other member, following a national “culture” or national “specificity” criterion. My method consists, instead, of describing the relations that derive from practices (of surveillance, of control, etc.) and not from “supposedly national cultures”. These practices that derive their agency from being embedded in (or transversal to) various organizations and institutions, are to be determined through professional networks, which are inscribed into a social space beyond the boundaries of the cultures of national states. This field beyond state boundaries then creates forms of collaboration and competition, which are established between agencies previously in little contact with one another (armies, intelligence agencies, military police, border control, customs control, judiciary police, civil security, the justice system). This compels the police to move part of their operations beyond State borders and to remain there, as is shown by the policing in UN missions, Kosovo or even now Afghanistan. Similarly, the field compels the military to become more and more interested in what occurs within national borders, as is shown by the phone tapping, the moni-

35. It is not a question of a series of autonomous, rational fields, but of a field in which, for example, the strategic decisions of the BKA have an impact on the German institutions of the BGS but also on the French PJ or the Italian DIA by a series of mediations such as those I have described. See Bigo D. (1998) Sécurité intérieure, implications pour la défense. Research Report, DAS, French Ministry of Defence.
toring of trans-border activities and now the detention of “enemy aliens” inside the national territory. It is even more compelling for the agencies that mediate between these two realms (intelligence services, police with military status, or customs and immigration offices) by obliging them to re-structure their missions along the line of the so-called new global threat, which itself varies in time: global organized crime, failed states or now war on terror. The field effect introduces new systems of interaction between the agencies by re-structuring their boundaries with regard to their missions, laying the ground for eventual budgetary competition and playing with their roles within the overall function of coercion, or more precisely, the management of threats. It compels the privatization of certain forms of (in)security (above all, over individuals, but also over local or community matters and sometimes going as far as the privatization of military activities) and compels public agencies to focus on the forms of (in)security that stretch between the internal and external domains. It may change, on rare occasions, the overall sense of priorities. It makes the domain of policing privilege organized crime and terrorism over prevention or community policing, and makes the military world allocate more public discourses and sometimes resources to the so-called “transversal threats” and their prevention than to the (previous) questions of deterrence and proliferation. The contemporary field of (in)security at the European level can then be described as a certain universe producing a specific knowledge, confronting social agents existing at different institutional positions. In this field we find “representatives” of security issues not only among the territorially-based agents we would expect, such as police or police with military status, customs agents, high-ranking functionaries of the ministries of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs or Defense departments; we also find politicians who specialize in these issues. Military strategists join this field and enter into struggles modifying the complex economy of relations between the previous agencies of “internal” security (police, police with military status, customs, immigration and asylum services), however tangentially. The new reach of the military correlates with a general tendency to place strategic emphasis on internal security while becoming disinterested in more classically defence-related questions. These (in)security professionals have traditionally come from the realms of police, customs and police with military status, but more recently have tended to come from new fields: the ranks of lawyers, diplomats, military officials and managers of companies working

36. See the contribution of E.-P. Guittet in this volume.
37. Terrorism, organized crime, with the development of biometrics, huge databases of surveillance, change in airports, traditional war, state-building and reconstruction of democracy.
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in the production of materials used by these administrations, politicians specializing in defence-related issues, members of groups related to these milieux and, last but not least, academics who specialize in security studies 38. Thus, the agents of the field of (in)security, despite their apparent diversity, can be defined as professionals of the management of threat or unease, producers of power-knowledge on the dualism security/insecurity.

Yet, what is essential is not to exhaustively name these agents but to discern and analyse what holds these different constituent parts together, what makes them enter into competition for a set of stakes that they had never previously recognized when they were indifferent to each other. This is why my research dealt with the practices and relations between four previously unconnected conceptual worlds — internal security, external security, war and conflict, and crime and delinquency — in the attempt to think the relations between the police and the army, crime and war, “upper worlds” and underworlds, agencies responsible for surveillance and their targets and technologies. Here, it is necessary to tie together earlier works on these issues in order to show how the narrative space of the agents I have just discussed vis-à-vis threats is re-translated, on the one hand, into a space of social positions by the intermediary of their particular social and institutional positions or habitus and, on the other, via a transversal dispositif that connects their practices. But what is immediately at stake here is to understand how practical effects of the field enter into operation.

To speak of the field of (in)security requires that we go beyond inventorying the agencies that one suspects of participating in the “function” of coercion. It requires that we immediately question the characteristics, limits, and effects of the field. Empirically, it is necessary to describe the effects of the field by giving examples and showing how they act, whether this occurs in terms of “polarization,” “differentiation,” “folding,” “involution,” or even “hollowing-out” 39. We need indeed to set the constraints and

38. Here I acknowledge the critique of Ole Waever and Barry Buzan. They have argued that the field of security, as I had defined it in *Polices en réseaux*, was too limited and placed too much stress on the relations between essentially bureaucratic agencies, creating thus a “fixed point.” Consequently, they argued, it was necessary to depart from the semantic network created by points of reference explicitly citing security, and extend the analysis to include private actors.

39. The dynamic of the field of security tends to constantly enlarge itself, but it can of course also diminish. It is possible to de-securitize. One problem that results thus is that of “holes” created in space or the “differences in pressure” that the undertow of these structures creates. Space is not homogenous to the borders of the field. This is both true in terms of activities and in geographic terms. Rather than resembling a sphere, the field resembles the topology of a French gruyère. I owe this idea to the paper presented by John Crowley at the military school of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan on the forms of contemporary security, and the English
opportunities that the field gives to the agents — effects that are visible — and to understand their less visible relations both inside and outside the field. These field effects will trace the limits of the field in rough contours — limits that are never given but depend on the particular (con)figuration of a given moment of a struggle within the field and between this specific field and other fields — and will determine the effects of domination between the fields concerning truth of contested norms (i.e. truth about the weapons of mass destruction and the competition for the “last say” between the professionals of politics and the professionals of (in)security).

The Ban-opticon Dispositif

The set of the field effects I mentioned above does not stem only from the processes and relations between the agents of the field. It is also the result of their relations with other fields. These relations are formed by the dispositif that cross between institutions and are not reducible to the logics of these institutions, or even to the habitus of their agents, in Bourdieu’s sense of the term.

Michel Foucault speaks of the dispositif of sexuality and the dispositif of the prison. We know quite well that his thinking on the prison was inspired by Jeremy Bentham’s image of the panopticon, due to the fact that it simultaneously stood for architecture, discourse, field of rationality and strategic project, while it embodied the will to scientific knowledge. Many dispositifs themselves to Jon Solomon. This topology of the hole or gruyère should be connected to the idea of the Mòbius ribbon. 40. The idea of transversal field or network has to be connected to the Foucauldian notion of dispositif. As first explained and further repeated by Foucault (‘Le jeu de Michel Foucault’, Ornicar, July 1977, 12 and Dits et Ecrits III: 299: translated by Grosrichard, A. as ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ in C. Gordon (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, New York: Harvester Press, 1982: 194-195), a dispositif is: “firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical and moral propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of that apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as the program of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening it for a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of — shall we say — formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The appa-
Discussions about Foucault’s use of Bentham are twofold: they criticize Foucault’s partial reading of Bentham, while reminding us that the number of prisons actually constructed on Bentham’s model was quite small and that the prison changed function during the classical period, as in the case of the institution of galley slaves, when they were not on ships. But, to answer this criticism, it is central to acknowledge that the dispositif does not manifest itself in a single institution of the prison. It is rather transversal. It requires heterogeneity, diversity. It is not the prison’s function as an enclosed punitive space that is crucial but rather the fact that the prison concentrates in one specific space the mechanisms of control and surveillance that are scattered throughout society in institutions such as factories, barracks and schools. In Foucault’s work, the panopticon is useful because not only does it allow us to understand the prison, as it does in Bentham’s work, but it also serves as a way to understand how society functions at large.

If the (in)security program undertaken by some agents is, without a doubt, a programmatic strategy of an escalating generalized surveillance to a level that is both as globalized and as individualized as possible, it is not at all the diagram of the effects of power and resistance. If the panoptic dispositif exists in the Foucauldian sense, it is in a fragmented and heterogeneous way and there is no centralized manifestation of it, quite contrary to the various claims of US imperial domination that have been promulgated since September 11. If its effects persist, the sense of empire to which it is subject corresponds more to Hardt and Negri’s use of the term Empire, in which the various political processes of state coalitions, manoeuvres of large corporations and the effects of polling that empiricize the “unease” of mass destruction converge towards the strengthening of the informatric and biometric as modes of surveillance that focus on the trans-border movements of individuals. This diagram is not a panopticon transposed to a global level; it is what we call — in combining the term “ban” of Jean Luc Nancy, as refigured by Giorgio Agamben, and the term “opticon”, as used by Foucault — a Ban-opticon. This formulation of the Ban-opticon allows us to understand how

41. This term, Ban, which comes from old German, both signifies the exclusion enacted by the community and serves as the insignia of sovereignty. It is what is excluded from sovereignty on high as exception to the rule and what is excluded from below as discrimination, rejection, repulsion, and banishment. René Girard has already called our attention to this
a network of heterogeneous and transversal practices functions and makes sense as a form of (in)security at the transnational level. It allows us to analyse the collection of heterogeneous bodies of discourses (on threats, immigration, enemy within, immigrant fifth column, radical Muslims versus good Muslims, exclusion versus integration, etc.), of institutions (public agencies, governments, international organizations, NGOs, etc.), of architectural structures (detention centers, waiting zones and Schengen traffic lanes in airports, integrated video camera networks in some cities, electronic networks outfitted with security and video-surveillance capacities), of laws (on terrorism, organized crime, immigration, clandestine labour, asylum seekers, or to accelerate justice procedures and to restrict the defendants’ rights), and of administrative measures (regulation of the “sans papiers”, negotiated agreements between government agencies vis-à-vis policies of deportation/repatriation, “common” aeroplanes specially hired for deportation with costs shared by different national polices, etc.). It allows us to understand that the surveillance of everyone is not on the current agenda but that the surveillance of a small number of people, who are trapped into the imperative of mobility while the majority is normalized, is definitely the main tendency of the policing of the global age.

I would like to sketch out, here, three dimensions of this Ban-opticon to convey how control and surveillance of certain minority groups take place at a distance. This surveillance of the minority profiled as “unwelcome” is, in my opinion, the strategic function of the diagram — a function opposed to the surveillance of the entire population (or the Pan), which is only the dream of a few agents of power, even if the rhetoric after September 11 articulates a “total” information.

The Ban-opticon is then characterized by the exceptionalism of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to become permanent), by the way it excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behaviour (profiling) and by the way it normalizes the non-excluded through its production of normative imperatives, the most important of which is free movement (the so-called four freedoms of circulation of the EU: concerning goods, capital, information, services and persons).

This Ban-opticon is deployed at a level that supersedes the nation-state and forces governments to strengthen their collaboration in more or
less globalized spaces, both physical and virtual, sometimes global or Westernized, and still more frequently Europeanized. The effects of power and resistance are thus no longer contained by the political matrix of the relation between State and society. They exceed the frame of representations inscribed within the nation-state, disconnect the direct relations between state and individuals inside and between the external of the nation-state in its relation with other states, as a different universe.

Exceptionalism inside liberalism

To speak of the exceptionalism of power refers to the relation between the juridical production of “special” laws and its symbolic legitimising effects (state of emergency, exceptional and derogatory measures, administrative routines issued from earlier special legislation), as well as to how the “dominated” of a specific time and place are socialized by their rulers to believe that they are deciding what kind of dominating powers are acceptable or not. This relation, as we know, is far from being stable and far from being given once and for all. The distinction between the governing and the governed is an effect at the macro-level of molecular relations of power (and resistance). Liberalism has tried to legitimate its own domination through the idea of the separation of powers by which power is supposed to limit itself, particularly through checks and balances, with the effect that the population finally actively consents to be an accomplice of its own domination and to rely on “justice” and lawyers for its “freedom”. Framed in that way, liberalism is the contrary of exceptionalism. Liberalism is seen as the opposite of a “sovereign” or “raison d’Etat” thinking. Yet, between the definitions of exceptionalism as suspension of law or break in normality, there is room for other visions of exceptionalism that combine exception both with liberalism and with the routinized dispositif of technologies of control and surveillance. Exception works hand in hand with liberalism and gives the key to understanding its normal functioning, as soon as we avoid seeing exception as a sole matter of special laws.

Nevertheless, one of the first questions of the present is about the status of these special laws and the exceptional powers they provide for. It does not seem that they “suspend every law”, they just derogate from normalized legislations, some of which are special laws that we have become habituated to live with. But they install at the heart of our present time the idea that we are living in a “permanent state of emergency” or in a permanent state of exception. Does their mere existence not reconfigure the existence of routinized norms? Is it the norm that defines the exception or the exception that defines the norm? Giorgio Agamben, strongly influenced by Carl
Schmitt, invokes the possibility that exercising sovereignty means the possibility of being at the same time within and outside of the juridical order, given the possibility that sovereign power can proclaim a state of exception (Ausnahme), thereby suspending the validity of its own juridical order 43. The exception is then more interesting than the norm since it defines the limit that permits the establishment of interiority, which is to say, to “enclose the outside,” as Blanchot writes. This process of interiorization allows sovereignty or exception to delimit both the space and the object to which it applies. But, for this to take place, it is necessary for the sovereign to “overhang” this space, to exteriorize himself in order to set the limits of inclusion. The paradox thus resembles Escher’s famous ink-drawn hands as they draw one another. In thinking the contingency of the line drawn, it is necessary to think not only in terms of inside and outside but also in terms of the meta-level that allows the contingency of the drawing of the border between inside and outside. This is what one could call an overlapping hierarchy, or the effect of auto-organization where the institutor and the instituted of the line are mutually constitutive. The topological figure that represents this co-production of the institution, where the instituted depends on the institutor (but this institutor is itself instituted by its instituted), is the same figure as the one that allows us to understand the objective indetermination of the borders and that makes the differentiation between internal and external an intersubjective difference — the figure of the Möbius ribbon or strip 44. This figure suggests a topology that blocks the traced line of a circle from simply cutting the sacred off from the profane, internal from external, institutor from instituted. It is no longer possible for the border to be made objective, forever given and intelligible, simply because it is inscribed in space and time. The border depends on the look given by the observer and his position, while his judgment on what is internal or external will vary according to this position, in the same way as his view of what he institutes, or of what is instituted upon him. From this point of view on what a border is, the relation of exception is not derived from the sovereign relation of exclusion, it is a relation of exclusion that engenders the sense of norm and juridical order in suspending — for a certain time — an object of the juridical order, and that is different than a simple relation of spatial interdiction that would fabricate an outside by enclosing it in a circle.

It is this “suspension” of juridical categories and the possibility of inventing new ones at the same time in order to fill the “hole” that create uncertainty and doubt. Uncertainty, from which power can profit in practice, to destabilise the “old” categories (such as the concept of war, of prisoner of war or of asylum seeker) by redefining them against their previous juridical meaning, in shifting their relations by an infusion of a new “category”, i.e. the enemy combatant. Thus, as long as the US government continues to invoke the difference between the war on terrorism and the war on what concerns the rules applied to prisoners of war, it plays an extreme form of exceptionalism that suspends juridical order and reconfigures it by putting in place new categories that must be defined and that occupy a space previously filled by another concept. This process persists as long as it continues to redefine the pact of protection, in refusing to apply it to foreigners living on its own soil, as it historically did with Japanese internees during the Second World War, or when its power asserts itself beyond its own proper territory by sending missiles to execute “terrorists” in Yemen, while presenting this action as an international police operation and an executive decision of justice. This particular form of exceptionalism that one can designate as illiberal practices at the heart of liberalism seems to be one of the contemporary features of the Ban-opticon.

Exclusion and pro-active governmentality

The Ban-opticon’s second defining trait is its ability to construct categories of excluded people connected to the management of life. The ban is a limit condition of the political relation. As one of our informants from an intelligence agency explained, if the media and judicial policy exaggerate

45. Agamben suggests that we replace the Marxist schism between man and citizen with a distinction between naked life and multiple forms of life abstractly re-codified in juridico-social identities (the elector, the employee, the journalist, etc.). He suggests rethinking politics from the point of view of the experience of the concentration camps, re-linking the two opposing sides of sovereign power and the bio-political, the fact of adjudicating death and the fact of directing life, which Foucault had opposed. He reckons that contemporary power is founded on the disassociation of forms of life and on the will to restore man to his naked life (isolated from his codified form) in radicalizing the exclusion by sovereign exceptionalism. But this thesis departs from a limit situation and, thus, exaggerates the capabilities of power and confuses its programmatic dream with the diagram of forces (and resistances). Forms of life are constantly in the process of re-emerging, even in the most desperate of cases. Forms of resistance always exist, as hidden transcripts that mock power even where it seems to apply itself in a unilateral manner. James Scott has shown the resistance of slaves, and one could demonstrate ongoing resistance on the part of refugees against the will to make them nothing but docile bodies struggling to protect themselves. See Scott, J.C. (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.
the phenomenon in order to reassure good citizens and deter the others, they are in effect operating at the level of tactics, which can be modulated according to public opinion. In contrast, it is strategic to collect information on the part of a society that no longer lives under the same rules, with the same norms as the mainstream. Far from the spotlight, targeting the “abnormals”, a re-fashioning of policing and surveillance is taking place, capable of enlarging its scope by the use of intensive technologies of biometrics and shared databases. There, beyond the simulacrum of a politics of proximity designed to reassure the good citizens, and the zero tolerance designed to deter the rest, the knowledge of the “others”, which is by far the most significant resource in the management of crowds, is acquired. By mixing files from the public realm (social security, taxes) and the private realm (insurance, credit bureaus, supermarkets) with police files, it is possible to classify and sort among the elements to formulate what and who must be surveyed. According to these police and criminal “experts”, these processes keep the repressive machine from getting jammed, while allowing it to avoid conveying a negative image that could invoke a sense of oppression barely being held at bay.

The goal of the normalization and management of societal risks should not be seen purely as a police responsibility, these experts say. Its distribution across the whole assembly of risk management systems should be recognized (insurance, private investigators firms, retail superstores, and public welfare institutions). This program of risk management and normalization is based on the ideals of rational choice and on the using of proactive techniques of management to anticipate individuals’ movements. It is spread throughout society and encourages people to collaborate, as in the case of local security contracts or of collaborations between police and educators, or as it occurs in Italy, where the converging visions of neighbourhood committees, municipal authorities and police combine to put the blame on immigrants46.

New Haven: Yale University Press. Their individual will, despite their denudation, cannot be reduced to the will of states, even in spite of these governmental pressures. Examples in international airports’ waiting zones and in detention centres show how the administration is led astray, flummoxed, trapped by its capacities of declining multiple identities. Refugees are only denizens in the eyes of governments and of the professional managers of unease, but in their own eyes they are citizens of multiple states or citizens of the world. See Hammar, T. (1985) European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The ability to resist, including resistance taking place in a space like a prison or a camp, leads professionals to try to avoid these situations and to manage from a location “upstream” which is not simply anterior in space, but prior in time. The film Minority Report, where the police are able to intervene even before the crime is committed by an anticipatory knowledge of the future, is the dream of this proactive police. (Philip K. Dick’s Minority Report is subtler than the film and raises a ferocious critique of this police vision. The film dilutes the force of this critique somewhat). 46. Palidda, S. (1997) op. cit.
The basic units conducting proactive analysis will not be limited to the police but will vary to occasionally include the military and customs officials and to be linked to insurance, social and credit organizations, schools, prefectures, tax organizations and social security organizations, consulates and criminologists, provided that they are action-oriented.

All this effort to collect information and to proliferate data that is now technologically possible seeks mainly to substitute the logic of proactiveness to the two other logics: repression and prevention. The pure repressive logic inevitably intervenes too late and is directed at the individual, while the policemen are the firemen of crime; the other is a preventive structural logic diminishing the roots of violence that, according to the police, is no more effective than a smokescreen, or a reform impossible to implement without also changing political or economic regimes. The logic of proactiveness aims to act before an offence is committed, by collecting information oriented toward repressive action and by anticipating the behaviour of dangerous individuals or groups. Prevention is therefore always invested with a virtual coercive dimension. The game is no longer

47. To give but one example of technologies operative at the European level, multiple databases are put in place to permit the profiling of risks associated with certain individuals. Concerning crime, other than the already ageing Interpol database, the Sirene system facilitates the rapid circulation of judiciary documents and the exchange of information. Since the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere meeting, justice has followed in step with other security agencies and has done the same thing at a distance via networks. The Sirene network, which passes information on criminal procedures and decisions between states, puts liaison judges in place. The creation of Eurojust and the forgetting of corpus juris provoke disequilibrium between the judges of instruction and of accusation, who are able to draw on EU resources, and the suspects' lawyers, who are confined within a national frame and have no access to this information. Yet, this point is considered secondary to the cause of speed and efficiency.

The Schengen information system manages individual dossiers and functions as a file preventing illegal migrants from returning to the EU. It is not very effective at managing criminality. In fact, Schengen constantly enlarges its sphere of application under the obligation of uniformity, that acts like a norm not only in the EU but also at the level of GATT. In the same way, the exceptional possibilities of identity control in border zones up to twenty kilometers from the border generalizes itself in all countries, even in countries where the concept of legitimate suspicion envelops controls very strictly. It is hardly even contested by the police authorities in question that Schengen institutes an immigration police, that this is its priority (even though only five years ago there was a great resistance to using it) and that there is no focus on the relation between crime and disappeared persons. This link that the SIS puts in place between criminal files and foreigners’ files with respect to foreigners reaffirms the suspicion against them and focuses the attention on petty crime or minor illegalities, while making primary police and customs offences. Certainly, these techniques are mutually reinforcing and overlap intelligence bases but scarcely facilitate the elaboration of profiles.

In fact, under Schengen, there are more sophisticated databases for analyzing groups that pose a risk, as opposed to keeping their movements under surveillance.
the committing of an act itself, but the “signal” that an offence might possibly be committed by an individual or a group that potentially represents a risk. The priority now is no longer on sanctions but on regulation. The issue is less about condemning an individual than about deterring others, but it consists above all of managing movement and flux, of managing groups of people in advance, analysing their potential future, in order to normalize them.

Normalization and the imperative of free movement

In contemporary societies, normalization occurs primarily through: a) the imperative of free movement of people, in particular in the European Union or the Schengen space, which is different from the North American space of NAFTA in that it explicitly recognizes this imperative; b) the combination of three elements: a connection between speed and movement, the right to movement and the freedom to move on a global scale. It is this normalization that Zygmunt Bauman refers to when he invokes the new logics of exclusion between those who are free to circulate and those who are trapped in the local. Actually, as he alerts

The Eurodac database contains digital fingerprints of asylum-seekers, as well as an explication of the motives they have given and the reasons for which they have been refused entry. The task is to prevent multiple applications but also to spot the stereotypical narratives of asylum-seekers. In parallel with Eurodac, a securitized net is being developed to address FADO (false and authentic documents) that will function on the basis of information exchange concerning false documents. The idea is to invert current practice and place the burden of proof on the person submitting the document. In Northern Europe, the US firm Printrack International is pushing its services that enable tracking and automatic identification of people crossing borders, whether by cards with digitalized fingerprints in ports and airports, or retinal imprints. The goal is to control identities in the most invisible manner possible, due to the fact that this society of individuals does not like to be affected or slowed down when controlled, but as long as they do not register the act of control they do not protest. One can therefore think of generalizing in the future the system in airports. At present, the link between card, credit and information is under research; it will be the same cards containing such information, some of which will be readable only by the police and not the card-holder.

Profiling done for Europol files tends to make surveillance more refined and precise rather than extending its general reach. Europol registers people who are capable of following through on their potential to commit a crime. Distinct from the Interpol databases, the entries of which are dependent on criminals who are effectively fugitive from justice, the Europol files contain sought-after criminals, suspects who have not entered yet the system of juridical inquiry, lists of possible informants, possible witnesses who might testify about their neighbor or colleague, victims or persons susceptible of being victims. It amounts here to reconstructing individual or social trajectories, marking territories or borders between populations at risk and others, analyzing and deciding who is dangerous. Here, we are at the heart of the pro-active logic.
us in *Globalization: the human consequences*, globalization can be analysed as a spatio-temporal compression that modifies the modes in which people come and go 48.

But in contrast to Bauman’s claim, we need to distinguish more precisely between movement and being free and see how a metonymy becomes established through this fusion of circulation/liberty to both diminish the notion of liberty and provoke disequilibrium between the notions of security and liberty. Zygmunt Bauman seems to consider himself to benefit from the liberty of the richest and to propose more mobility for the poorest, seeing neither the way this normative imperative of mobility imposes itself, nor the dispositif that makes mobility desirable. He sees the repressive dimension of the dispositif only for the poor but seems to neglect its considerable normative and productive dimensions, where the two are completely indissociable. Power is not only repressive. It induces and produces modes of behaviour. The discourses on free movement are central. They normalize the majority and allow for the surveillance to be concentrated on a minority.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, this dispositif, the strategic function of which is the control and the surveillance of certain selected groups of people exempted from the majority, and which hinges on the field of professionals of the mana-

48. “Globalization divides as much as it unites; it divides as it unites — the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe. Alongside the emerging planetary dimensions of business, finance, trade and information flow, a ‘localizing,’ space-fixing process is set in motion. Between them, the two closely inter-connected processes sharply differentiate the existential conditions of entire populations and of various segments of each one of the populations. What appears as globalization for some means localizing for others; signalling a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an uninvited and cruel fate. Mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted values — and the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and unevenly distributed commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying factor of our late modern or post-modern times [...] All of us are, willy-nilly, by design or default, on the move [...] some of us become fully and truly ‘global’; some are fixed in their ‘locality’— a predicament neither pleasurable nor endurable in the world where ‘ globals’ set the tone and compose the rules of the life-game [...] Being local in a globalized world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation. The discomforts of localized existence are compounded by the fact that with public spaces removed beyond the reaches of localized life, localities are losing their meaning-generating and meaning-negotiating capacity and are increasingly dependent on sense-giving and interpreting actions which they do not control — so much for the communitarianist dreams/consolations of the globalized intellectuals [...] An integral part of the globalizing processes is progressive spatial segregation, separation and exclusion”: Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia University Press: 2-3.
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moral propositions on illegal migrants, fake refugees, or young children of immigrant parents.

This **dispositif** is no longer the panopticon described by Bentham. It is a Ban-opticon. It depends no longer on immobilizing bodies under the analytic gaze of the watcher but on profiles that signify differences, on exception- nalism with respect to norms and on the rapidity with which one “evacuates.” The **dispositif** of this new surveillance takes another form, recalling technologies of information technology and virtual reality. This **dispositif** appears like a virtual montage (morphing) of all the positions of individuals in the process of flux. From an initial image (the immigrant, the ghetto youth) to a final image (terrorist, drug-runner), all the steps of transformation are re- constituted virtually. In this respect, this **dispositif** channels flows instead of dissecting bodies. Like the panopticon **dispositif**, this ban-opticon dispositif of morphing produces a knowledge, as well as statements on threats and on security that reinforce the belief in a capacity to decrypt, even prior to the individual himself, what its trajectories, its itineraries will be. This **dispositif** depends on the control of movement more than the control of stocks in a territory. It depends on “monitoring the future”, as in Philip K Dick's novel *Minority Report*, rather than surveying the present in accordance to the official past. It is management at a distance in space and time of the “abnormals”. Where, previously, people had been assigned places of residence, they are now placed in “waiting zones” and assigned identities not even lived as such. A skin colour, an accent, an attitude and one is slotted, extracted from the unmarked masses and, if necessary, evacuated. Policing is thus an affair of the margin, of clean-up, and needs concern itself only minimally with “norms.” These new logics of control and surveillance are not necessarily much more effective, more rational. The advantage for the unmarked masses is that they have the impression of being free, to the benefit of the institution, and since control only bears on a few, it is more economical. Only the control of crime is less effective than before as a consequence of these a priori. Its sphere of application remains fragile and subject to resistance.

There is no doubt that we must conduct more detailed research into the connection between the practices of security professionals and the systems of justification of their activities, as we ponder on how procedures of truth-claims are formulated, and how the centres of their production are localized, questions from which academics are by no means excluded. It is also important to understand the relations between transnationalization, globalization of the (in)security agencies' practices and those of their “targets” to put them in relation with — inasmuch as one can — the specific Europeanization process. This process is conducted more or less in the different political arenas by systems of justification of construction and priority of unease, which correspond
to each national and professional culture, but out of which emerges the necessity of an organization like Europol to act as a kind of “stock exchange of threats, fears and uneases” and of their management. This institutionalization creates in return a transfiguration of the threats by giving them the quality of being “global” and then “more dangerous”. It is finally necessary to reconnect the questions of the constituting of a space of liberty, security and justice with the questions of the construction of a society beyond its status as a national state, posing the problem of how its identity is mapped out, and to understand how the convergence of uneases circling around the figure of the poor extra-communitarian migrant speaks volumes about how liberalism operates in a society of risk. In effect, as Foucault reminds us, if we agree to see in liberalism a new art of governing and governing each other — not a new economic or juridical doctrine — if it really amounts to a technique of governmentality that aims to consume liberties, and by virtue of this, manage and organize them, then the conditions of possibility for acceding to liberty depend on manipulating the interests that engage the security strategies destined to ward off the dangers inherent to the manufacture of liberty, where the constraints, controls, mechanisms or surveillance that play themselves out in disciplinary techniques charged with investing themselves in the behaviour of individuals… from that point on the idea that living dangerously must be considered as the very currency of liberalism 49.

ANNEXE 1: Topology of the transnational field of the professionals of unease management: Social space of institutional positions / Social space of standpoints concerning (in)security: structural homology and graphs
Key references